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Abstract. Anarchism does not feature in contemporary international relations (IR) as a
discreet approach to world politics because until very recently it was antithetical to the
traditional use-value of a discipline largely structured around the needs and intellectual
demands of providing for the world’s Foreign Oﬃces and State Departments. This article
tells part of the story of how this came to be so by revisiting the historiography of the
discipline and an early debate between Harold Laski and Hans Morgenthau. What I will
show here is that Morgenthau’s Schmittian-informed theory of the nation state was
diametrically opposed to Laski’s Proudhon-informed pluralist state theory. Morgenthau’s
success and the triumph of Realism structured the subsequent evolution of the discipline.
What was to characterise the early stages of this evolution was IR’s professional and
intellectual statism. The subsequent historiography of the discipline has also played a part
in retrospectively keeping anarchism out. This article demonstrates how a return to this
early debate and the historiography of the discipline opens up a little more room for
anarchism in contemporary IR and suggests further avenues for research.
Alex Prichard is ESRC Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Bristol. He gained
his PhD from Loughborough University in 2008 which will be published as The International
Political Theory of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: A World Without Sovereigns (Routledge, 2011). He
is currently publishing a series of articles on the intersections between anarchism and IR.
He is founder and convenor of the PSA Anarchist Studies Network and is co-editor of
‘Contemporary Anarchist Studies’, a new book series to be published by Continuum.
Today, our schools of rationality baulk at having their histories written, which is no doubt
significant.1
Introduction
In this article I want to tell part of the story of the evolution of IR by reference
to absence. I will show how something has come to be the way it is because it has
* Earlier drafts of this article were presented at the BISA annual conference at the University of
Cambridge and the CRIPT workshop on International Political Theory at Aberystwyth University.
I would like to thank participants at these event and also Luke Ashworth, Oliver Daddow, David
Dyzenhaus, Ana Juncos, George Lawson, Tim Moonen, Bill Scheuerman and Casper Sylvest, and
three anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. This article was finalised during an
ESRC Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Bristol, Grant code: PTA-026-27-2404.
1 Michel Foucault, ‘Politics and Reason’, in Lawrence D. Kritzman, (ed.), Politics, Philosophy,
Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977–1984 (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 83.
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consistently ignored and marginalised something else, something that did not fit the
traditional self-image or practical use-value of the discipline. The ‘other’ in this
case is the political philosophy of anarchism and the grand, hegemonic self is IR.
Mainstream IR has traditionally been a statist beast because anti-statism has, until
rather recently, been anathema to the practical reason of IR theorists and the
would-be mandarins of the discipline. Accounting for the absence of anarchism, I
will argue, tells us much about this history and traditional purpose of IR because
accounting for this absence brings evidence to light that illustrates the political
reasons why mainstream IR has traditionally been ontologically and normatively
statist. Uncontroversial in itself, this claim nevertheless suggests that there is plenty
of room for anarchism in the contemporary discipline.
What I will show is that anarchism played a modest but challenging part in the
intellectual debates of the inter-war and post-war period, but that this contribution
has been widely ignored and the subsequent historiography of the discipline has
obscured it from view. While there is a large and growing body of literature that
has gone a long way towards correcting the misleading caricatures of the inter-war
period,2 the place of anarchism in these debates remains under-appreciated. There
are quite clear political, historical and methodological reasons for this, reasons I
will attempt to untangle here. Thus, my aim in this article is to contribute to this
historiographical scholarship by uncovering another silenced tradition of thought
that once played some role at least in forming the contemporary discipline, account
for its absence and attempt to reconstruct a long-forgotten debate so as to bring
anarchism and IR back together once again.
This article also contributes to scholarship that is developing a specifically
anarchist approach to world politics.3 What is missing in this literature is a sense
of historical antecedent. My aim here is thus to discuss one early attempt so that
lessons might be learned and historical depth given to broad current debates. In
2 Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History
of International Relations’, International Relations, 61 (2002), pp. 33–51; Lucien Ashworth, ‘Where
Are the Idealists in Interwar International Relations?’, Review of International Studies, 32 (2006),
pp. 291–308; Duncan Bell, ‘International Relations: The dawn of a historiographical turn?’, British
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 3 (2001), pp. 115–26; Duncan Bell (ed.), Victorian
Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); David Long and Peter Wilson, Thinkers of the
Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); David Long
and Brian C. Schmidt, Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005); Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse
of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations (New York: State University of New
York Press, 1998); Peter Wilson, ‘The Myth of the First Great Debate’, Review of International
Studies, 24:5 (1998), pp. 1–16; Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Anarchy, World Politics and the Birth of a
Discipline: American International Relations, Pluralist Theory and the Myth of Interwar Idealism’,
International Relations, 16 (2002), pp. 9–31.
3 R. Osborn, ‘Noam Chomsky and the Realist Tradition’, Review of International Studies, 35 (2009),
pp. 351–70; E. Herring and P. Robinson, ‘“Introduction” to Forum on Chomsky’, Review of
International Studies, 29 (2003), pp. 551–2; Richard Falk, ‘Anarchism and World Order’, in J. R.
Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIX: Anarchism (New York, New York University Press
1979), pp. 63–87; Alex Prichard, ‘Justice, Order and Anarchy: The International Political Theory of
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865)’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 35 (2007), pp.
623–45; Alex Prichard, ‘Deepening Anarchism: International Relations and the Anarchist Ideal’,
Anarchist Studies, (forthcoming); Scott Turner, ‘Global Civil Society, Anarchy and Governance:
Assessing an Emerging Paradigm’, Journal of Peace Research, 35 (1998), pp. 25–42; Thomas Weiss,
‘The Tradition of Philosophical Anarchism and Future Directions in World Policy’, Journal of Peace
Research, 12 (1975), pp. 1–17.
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this article I will show how Proudhon’s ideas about the ontology of political order
and the motors of world politics informed the ideas of the most famous inter-war
pluralist, Harold Laski, professor of government at the LSE between 1926 and
1950, member of the Executive Committee of the British Labour party from 1936
and chair of the Labour party from 1945.4 Laski’s pluralism, developed in his first
works, Authority in the Modern State (1919), The Foundations of Sovereignty and
Other Essays (1921), and Liberty in the Modern State (1929), can be shown to have
openly Proudhonist features, both ontologically and politically.5
These works link to the origins of disciplinary IR through the almost
symmetrical critiques of Laski and Proudhon’s ideas advanced by Carl Schmitt and
Hans Morgenthau. It was the anarchistic and anti-statist aspect of Laski’s work
that was to disgust the German fascist Carl Schmitt, the ‘Streicher of the legal
profession’ as Morgenthau called him,6 who by criticising a prominent British
Jewish socialist in numerous publications, undoubtedly felt he was defending the
political and moral integrity of the totalitarian Third Reich. Schmitt had criticised
Laski’s work elsewhere prior to this,7 but his definitive statement of his position on
Laski’s pluralism can be found in his essay ‘Ethic of State and Pluralistic State’.8
What is most striking for our purposes is that it can be shown that Morgenthau
deployed similar Schmittian arguments against Laski for quite diﬀerent reasons. As
I will show, Morgenthau had three aims. The first was to buttress the moral
integrity of the US state so that nothing like the Third Reich would ever go
unchallenged by a major state again; the second was to defend the integrity of the
US state against the post-War Stalinist threat; and finally, the ethic of state central
to Morgenthau’s work was also arguably central to the possibility of an
autonomous discipline of IR. The ‘national interest’, a vacuous term at the best of
times, would be even more so in a pluralist state. Schmitt and Morgenthau both
sought to rebuild the moral foundations of the state in two quite distinct political
contexts and for quite diﬀerent purposes, but both developed a critique of Laski’s
anarchistic inclinations to make their arguments. I will show that it is because they
(perhaps wilfully) misunderstood or twisted Proudhon and Laski’s arguments to
4 I will be using the term pluralism exclusively as used by the predominantly English left-pluralists of
the mid-to-late 20th century. See, for example, F. M. Barnard and R. Vernon, ‘Pluralism,
Participation, and Politics: Reflections on the Intermediate Group’, Political Theory, 3 (1975),
pp. 180–97; Paul Hirst, From Statism to Pluralism: Democracy, Civil Society and Global Politics
(London: UCL Press, 1997); Richard Little, ‘The Growing Relevance of Pluralism?’, in Ken Booth,
Steve Smith and Marysia Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 66–86; C. Mouﬀe (ed.), Dimensions of Radical Democracy:
Pluralism, Citizenship, Community (London: Verso, 1992); Schmidt, The Political Discourse of
Anarchy, chap. 5; Casper Sylvest, ‘Beyond the State? Pluralism and Internationalism in Early
Twentieth-Century Britain’, International Relations, 21 (2002), pp. 67–85.
5 H. Laski, Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1921); H. Laski,
Communism (London: Butterworth, 1926); H. Laski, The State in Theory and Practice (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1935); H. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1947); H. J. Laski, Studies in the problem of sovereignty (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1917); H. J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919).
6 Cited in William E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield,
1999), p. 226.
7 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 41–5.
8 Carl Schmitt, ‘Ethic of State and Pluralistic State’, trans. David Dyzenhaus, in C. Mouﬀe (ed.), The
Challenge of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 1999), pp. 195–208. First published in Positionen und
Begriﬀe im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles 1923–1939 (Positions and Concepts in the Fight against
Weimar, Geneva, Versailles, 1923–1939) in 1940.
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their own ends that this debate is far from closed. The essay I will discuss here is
‘The Corruption of Liberal Thought: Harold Laski’, first published two years after
the first edition of Politics Among Nations, in Common Cause, March 1950, the
month Laski died, and republished in a collection of essays titled The Restoration
of American Politics in 1958.9
The article proceeds in the following manner. I begin by briefly discussing how
the historiography of the discipline goes a long way to obscuring anarchism from
view. Here I will argue two things. First I will make an explanatory and empirical
claim regarding the absence of anarchist thought in contemporary IR. I will argue
that despite the existence of a plethora of anarchist texts which engage squarely
with ‘the international’ broadly conceived, the ‘self-images of the discipline’, as
Steve Smith put it,10 have evolved in such a way that either anarchism has
implicitly been seen to be surplus to intellectual and political requirement, or has
been deliberately obscured from view. The secondary, emperical claim I make is
that post-War IR has evolved from a statist nucleus, through a series of debates
which have been constructed, post-hoc, to explain what IR is for and to reaﬃrm
the centrality of this statist core and the professional responsibilities which come
with defending the state. My political aim is to challenge that core and contribute
to contemporary post-statist approaches to IR,11 by bringing to light some of their
historical and disciplinary antecedents. In the second part of the article I begin by
summarising Proudhon’s approach to federalism and world politics, I then link it
to Laski’s work and then illustrate how both Carl Schmidt and Hans Morgenthau
repeat equally mistaken arguments against Laski’s work in order to substantiate
their own ideological positions.12 The aim here is to give a detailed analysis of how
anarchism was first marginalised in IR. In the conclusion I set out where anarchist
thought might usefully contribute to IR theory. I suggest that anarchist thinking
can help contribute to the work of those who are challenging traditional
understandings of who and what IR is for and help develop state theory, in IR.
The historiography of silence
The absence of anarchism cannot be explained by reference to any debate or to
anything intrinsically weak or factually inaccurate in the ideological morphology of
9 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The Corruption of Liberal Thought: Harold Laski’, in H. J. Morgenthau
(ed.), The Restoration of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Cf. Hans.
J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Brief ed.) (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1993). Another long-forgotten ‘debate’ (though, again, Carr had no interlocutors) is
the one between Carr and the nineteenth century anarchists. See, E. H. Carr, Michael Bakunin
(London: Macmillan, 1937); E. H. Carr, ‘Proudhon: The Robinson Crusoe of Socialism’, in E. H.
Carr (ed.), Studies in Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1950), pp. 38–55.
10 Steve Smith, ‘The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations’, in Steve
Smith and Ken Booth (eds), International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995),
pp. 1–37.
11 See, for example, R. K. Ashley, ‘Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy
Problematique’, Millennium, 17 (1988), pp. 227–62; A. Linklater, The Transformation of Political
Community: Ethical foundations of a Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
12 See, for example, Harmut Behr and Amelia Heath, ‘Misreading in IR Theory and Ideology Critique:
Morgenthau, Waltz and neo-realism’, Review of International Studies, 35 (2009), pp. 327–49.
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anarchism as a tradition in the history of political thought.13 To claim such would
involve the use of evidence, arguments and counter-arguments, and these do not
exist in IR. If we cannot look here for our account of the absence of anarchism,
then where ought we to look? Perhaps one of the most informative places to look
is the historiography of the discipline. Historiography is the study and practice of
history-writing. Because it involves unpacking empirical narratives, it is also itself
history-(re)writing. Traditional histories are engaged with by historiographers less
to tell us about the substantive object of study and more to tell us about the way
in which the object of study has traditionally been approached and narrated. This
is a necessary first step of any history-writing and, when done well, usually has
huge implications for common-sense knowledge about the world. We might thus
argue that historiography is the contextualising and de-naturalising of common
sense. Its eﬀect has usually been to deflate grandiose claims to universal knowledge
or perspectives; claims to have provided the best or final interpretations of events,
or to deflate Whig history, and also to uncover the history writers’ political,
normative and analytical biases.14
When it comes to anarchism and IR, the traditional statist historiography of IR
has obscured rather than enlightened. In keeping with statist historiography in the
discipline of history itself, the needs and ideological foundations of the state are
what were usually defended.15 And yet when IR went through the epistemological
turn in the 90s, the empirical history upon which the original narratives were based
were largely left unchallenged. Since then a huge literature has emerged that seeks
to re-build these early debates and show how the statist core of the discipline then
(as now) is far from ideologically neutral.
Let us begin with Martin Wight’s early piece ‘Why is there no international
theory’ which has been an important teaching tool for decades.16 What is
significant is less the bifurcation he makes between domestic and international, but
the claims he makes to substantiate this division and the political project that
underpins it. In many ways it is typical of much of the historiographical literature
in this regard. As is widely known, Wight argued that the aim of political theory
is to ascertain the best internal make-up of a state in order to build and protect
the good life. International theory, by contrast, did not exist in the pre-1945 era
for two main reasons. First, because no such comparable project of building and
defending the good life is possible in the lawless realm of world politics. This stated
fact provides Wight with the best explanation for why no one had until then
produced any international theory. The second reason why normative international
theory is impossible is because all recent attempts at overcoming the anarchy of the
13 On ideology, see for example, Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: a conceptual
approach (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).
14 A. Budd, The modern historiography reader: Western sources (London: Routledge, 2009); Peter
Lambert and P. R. Schofield (eds), Making history: an introduction to the history and practices of a
discipline (London: Routledge, 2004); Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Volume 1: Regarding
Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
15 The concerns of the state have been at the heart of the rise of modern history-writing. It was only
with the rise of socialism in the nineteenth century that the people, as opposed to the army, ‘great
men’ or governments, became a legitimate and explicit political subject for the discipline. For an
introduction to these debates see for example, Lambert and Schofield (eds), Making History, part II.
16 Martin Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory?’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight
(eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: George Allen
and Unwin, 1966).
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international system, by seeking to establish a world state or global imperium, have
failed. Moreover, none seems either desirable or likely for good, now fairly
intuitive reasons. International theory must therefore, he argues, be directed at
devising the means of regulating the international system as it exists in perpetuity.
It goes without saying that both claims are hugely contentious if not just
downright wrong. Proudhon’s voluminous writings on world politics are a case in
point. Not only did he reject the bifurcation of domestic and international, he would
almost certainly have rejected the ethical centrality of the state to the intellectual
project now known as IR.17 Wight’s eschatological conservatism, a conservatism
that posited the recurrence of war and anarchy until ‘the death of death’ at the
theological end of history,18 when history’s purpose would be revealed to humans
and this ‘divine act of judgement [. . .] will bring it [history] to an end’,19 would also
have been anathema to Proudhon’s ‘anti-theism’. Clearly if this is how one
conceives of the history and purpose of IR, anarchism can have no place in the
discipline.
Stanley Hoﬀmann’s famous argument, set out in ‘An American Social Science:
International Relations’, was empirically richer but perhaps equally misleading, it
is also baﬄing in its omissions and cynically conservative.20 Hoﬀmann claims IR
to be an American social science for a number of now well-known reasons. First,
Hoﬀmann repeats the prevailing assumption that international theory did not exist
in the pre-1945 era. However, Hoﬀmann argues that rather than international
theory being impossible at any time, as Wight had more or less argued, the rise of
a science of IR was actually impossible in the pre-1945 era because there was no
tradition of thinking about the international system conducive to scientific
modelling. What were needed to bring this about were the writings of key
individuals and the post-War dominance of the US in world aﬀairs. The two texts
which Hoﬀmann claims to have underpinned the new intellectual world order were
Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis, and Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations. Their
writings and the political context in which they emerged fed into the US need for
technical expertise to understand and manage a ‘bi-polar world’ overshadowed by
the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction. This need was met predominantly in
the US because of the proximity of ambitious IR theorists, including a number of
key émigrés, Hoﬀmann included, to the one state both able and willing to pay for
this technical expertise. Morgenthau’s work in particular made it possible to
develop a scientific approach to world politics, focusing analysis on the ‘real’ as
opposed to the ‘ideal’ and the promotion of ‘general propositions [. . .] grounded
in history’.21 Hoﬀmann is clear that their approaches were discipline-defining in an
America that needed to ‘justify a permanent and global involvement in world
17 For a summary of Proudhon’s views on international politics see, for example, Prichard, ‘Justice
Order and Anarchy’; Prichard, ‘Deepening Anarchism’; Cf. Daniel Pick, War Machine: The
Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1993),
chap. 4.
18 Martin Wight, ‘Why is There No International Theory?’, p. 34.
19 Cited in Timothy Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School
(Houndmills: Macmillan, in association with St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 1998), p. 53.
20 Stanley Hoﬀmann, ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, [1977] in Andrew
Linklater (ed.), International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science (London: Routledge,
2000), pp. 77–98.
21 Hoﬀmann, ‘American Social Science’, p. 80.
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aﬀairs’.22 Again, anarchism can have no place here and what I will discuss in the
following section is whether Morgenthau’s empirical and theoretical claims were
accurate.
While the technical maintenance of a bipolar world was a priority to which the
vast majority of analysis in IR devoted itself, it was nevertheless deeply upsetting
for Hoﬀmann. Moreover, it is not widely appreciated that Hoﬀmann was first and
foremost a historian of France and a political historian of European international
aﬀairs. As his essay ‘The Areal Division of Power in the Writings of French
Political Thinkers’, and the acknowledgements of Alan Ritter’s The Political
Thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon make clear, he was also fully acquainted with
Proudhon’s thought and its context.23 Proudhon’s thinking is however conspicuous
by its absence in Hoﬀmann’s essay despite championing the political sociology of
Raymond Aron and his ‘monumental Peace and War’,24 which is complementary
of Proudhon’s work,25 and in many ways mirrored Proudhon’s sociological, ethical
and ‘scientific’ approach that claimed to be able to accord ‘the international’
analytical autonomy.26 Moreover, Proudhon was anti-positivist, and his anarchist
thought, or those who drew on it faithfully, would in no way get caught up in
those ‘precious relays’ between the academy and Washington that so depressed
Hoﬀmann.27 So why not, at the very least, reference the existence of Proudhon’s
works? Bemoaning an omission is one thing, but what are the implications of this
move for our understanding of what IR is for? Like Wight, Hoﬀmann believed
bipolar great power politics needed managing and there is little in anarchism that
would be of use in this task.
Things continued in this vein for the following twenty years or so, and then in
the mid-1990s, IR had something of an epistemological turn. The emergence of
Frankfurt School critical theory, feminist and poststructuralist approaches to IR,
posed serious challenges to the traditional realist and neo-realist foundations of the
discipline. While the epistemological challenge to the mainstream presented by the
critics cannot be underestimated, the empirical reconstruction of the discipline took
longer to emerge. This was most problematic, for in leaving the historical narrative
intact and focusing mainly on method, history was ceded to the realists. In many
respects, Booth and Smith’s International Relations Theory Today marked this
watershed in IR theory and turning to Steve Smith’s introductory chapter ‘The
Self-Images of the discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory’
presents us with the evidence of how anarchism was once again inadvertently
marginalised.28
Smith’s purpose in his essay was to uncover the way in which IR’s traditional
‘self-images’, or how the genealogy of debates about who and what IR is for, has
22 Ibid., pp. 82, 84.
23 Stanley Hoﬀmann, ‘The Areal Division of Powers in the Writings of French Political Thinkers’, in
A. Maas (ed.), Area and Power (Glencoe: University of Illinois Press, 1959); Alan Ritter, The
Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. v.
24 Hoﬀmann, ‘An American Social Science’, p. 81.
25 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, trans. Richard Howard and
Annette Baker Fox (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 600–10.
26 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Du Principe Fédératif et de la Nécessité de Reconstituer le Parti de la
Révolution (includes) Si les Traités de 1815 ont Cessé d’Exister. Oeuvres Complètes De P-J Proudhon,
Vol. VIII (Paris: Ernest Flammarion, no date provided c. 1900).
27 Hoﬀmann, ‘An American Social Science’, p. 87.
28 Smith, ‘The Self-Images of a Discipline’.
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served to discipline how IR is done, what counts as normal and permissible and
what the implications of this disciplining might be for the praxis of world politics.
Smith’s focus was less on the silences and omissions or the substantive political
implications of this disciplining, and more on the epistemological presuppositions
that fuelled them. By taking this approach Smith posed a series of challenges to the
disciplinary mainstream and pushed forward a critical agenda that questioned, for
example, the bifurcation of domestic and international, the presupposition that a
non-normative IR theory was possible, that IR had in fact been constructed
around a series of so-called ‘Great Debates’ and so forth. But it was left to others
to fill in the empirical detail.
Typical of this literature, this methodologically-driven critique of the discipline
as it stood in the mid-nineties, served little to uncover the actual problems and
paradoxes of pre-1945 IR theory or replace the mythological narrative of IR’s
origins with a more empirically rich one. History itself was somehow tainted, or so
it seemed. Rejecting the self-images of the discipline on epistemological grounds
did nothing to redress the empirical gap that emerged: if there were no Great or
Inter-paradigm Debates, if what we then knew of IR’s history was a discursive
sleight of hand, what were all of these things actually concealing?
In his critique of Steve Smith’s chapter, (the now Lord) William Wallace argued
that IR ought to eschew the ‘scholastic’, theory-based discipline Smith was held to
be championing, and return to the empirical world and the ‘messy business of
democratic politics’. Indeed, Wallace dismissed Smith’s work as ‘self indulgent’
theory.29 However, what we as IR theorists were supposed to be doing instead was
fairly conventional – the analysis of democratic politics. For Wallace, while the
early founders of the discipline had sought to confront the ‘irrationalism and
historicism of Fascism, Nazism and Leninism’, contemporary theorists had simply
backed away from ‘critical engagement with the diﬃcult compromises of demo-
cratic politics’.30 Which is to say the status quo ante. As Smith and Booth both
argued in their responses, the tendency to return to statist solutions to statist
problems will perpetuate rather than ameliorate these state-formed problems.31
That said, it was another ten years before Booth drew his readers attention to
Richard Falk’s essay ‘Anarchism and World Order’32 as a viable alternative to
conventional mind-sets and remarked (in a footnote) that it was ‘among the most
thought provoking (and short) articles in the field, yet never appears in standard
collections’.33 This observation begs the central question of this article.
Despite Wallace’s pleas against the epistemological turn, it thoroughly shaped
subsequent critical investigation in IR in the late nineties. Unfortunately, the
tendency towards discourse-based methods also shaped historical investigation. As
29 W. Wallace, ‘Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International
Relations’, Review of International Studies, 22 (1996), pp. 304, 310.
30 Ibid., pp. 308, 309.
31 Steve Smith, ‘Power and truth: a reply to William Wallace’, Review of International Studies, 23
(1997), pp. 507–16; Ken Booth, ‘Discussion: A Reply to Wallace’, Review of International Studies,
23 (1997), pp. 371–7; Cf. Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organised Crime’, in
P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169–91.
32 Falk, ‘Anarchism and World Order’.
33 Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 62, n. 93.
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a direct response to Smith’s call for research, Brian Schmidt and Tim Dunne,
amongst others, sought to recover the history of the formation of the discipline
from the myths that had characterised it to date.34 Both took a discursive approach
to the history of ideas which to a large degree removed the background
international and social context from their purview. That said both texts seemed
to characterise a new sensitivity to the challenges faced by IR theorists wanting to
know what lay behind the myths Smith had so eloquently described.
For Schmidt, what defined IR over the ages was an intellectual and political
concern with anarchy – anarchy between sovereign states, anarchy within states
which are not sovereign and anarchy in areas of the world that had not yet been
‘civilised’. In each case the mainstream answer to the question of anarchy was the
state and the unfortunate side-eﬀect of the creation of yet another anarchy beyond
or above it. The early protagonists in this academic debate were key architects of
US foreign policy. These included individuals such as Francis Lieber, who
developed a military science for President Lincoln during the Civil War;35 Herbert
Baxter Adams and his Hegelian theory of the state, which was influenced by
Heinrich von Treitschke and was hugely influential in early US political science;
Adams’ subsequent tutoring of Woodrow Wilson also being instructive in this
regard.36 Further examples abound,37 the point being that, as Hoﬀmann argued,
IR and political science developed in the English-speaking world with the
requirements of the US state and the tried and tested ideas and techniques of the
Prussian state, as well as the British Imperial state, at its heart. Of the critical
voices, the English socialist pluralists Harold Laski and G. D. H Cole stand out,
in Schmidt’s analysis at least, as perhaps the lone radical and socialist voices in
IR’s 50-year pre-disciplinary period. Unfortunately, Schmidt’s discursive rather
than contextualist methodology precludes him from seeking out the anarchistic
origins of their ideas and thus reinforces the impression that there was no wider
tradition of anarchist thought that might contribute to IR, or that there was at the
very least no established alternative to statism.
One might therefore argue, with some justification, that where Wight and
Hoﬀmann suggested that we ought to manage the system in perpetuity, and
Wallace would have the discipline to retain an engaged but healthy distance from
the state, Schmidt shows us the imperialistic and murderous history of the system
we are supposed to maintain, manage or remain relatively detached from. While
Steve Smith and others have argued for a more critical approach, none have seen
the sense in turning to anarchism. It is also deeply ironic that despite being
quintessentially concerned with anarchy and a world without sovereigns, the
anarchists are never canvassed for their opinions by those working on the ‘political
discourse of anarchy’.
34 Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy; Dunne, Inventing International Society. Considerations
of space make it impossible to do justice to Dunne’s work here. In his perceptive review Duncan Bell
makes the comment that ‘[f]or a set of scholars usually regarded as amongst the most historically
astute in the field of IR, the English School’s sloppy attitude to the history of ideas is all the more
intriguing’. Bell, ‘International Relations’, p. 123.
35 Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy, p. 49; David W. Clinton, Tocqueville, Lieber, and
Bagehot: Liberalism Confronts the World (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003).
36 Ibid., p. 60.
37 Ibid., pp. 92–3, 127, 129, 130.
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Anarchism, pluralism and totalitarianism in inter-war IR
Developing Brian Schmidt’s research, I will now turn to the anarchist legacy in
pluralist approaches in early IR to try and show two things: how anarchist thought
was marginalised and why. Returning to the early debates in IR, re-narrating this
formative part of IR’s disciplinary past, also has the twin benefit of reuniting
anarchism with IR (on terms other than those that might be set by today’s
gatekeepers)38 and of re-narrating the discipline’s past to do so. What follows –
therefore, is a more detailed case study of the intellectual foundations of IR.
Broadly speaking, the inter-war pluralists sought to defend a political ethic that
respected and aﬃrmed the relative autonomy of a whole host of social, political
and economic cleavages, with the state but one of a multitude of units within a sort
of new medieval order.39 They believed that this pluralism, enmeshed with a firm
commitment to economic democracy and strong international institutions, would
pacify inter-state relations by restraining the state’s scope for unilateral action.
Most prominent amongst them, Harold Laski’s thought has nevertheless tradition-
ally been characterised as Marxist. There is undoubtedly truth in this, not least to
say that it would have been Laski’s Marxism that prompted him to see the promise
of salvation for the working class in both the British Labour Party and Stalin’s
Russia. However, Laski’s early political lineage is usually ignored while his
anti-capitalism (rather than his Proudhonist anti-statism) becomes the key feature
of his critique of world politics.40 Laski’s detractors, such as the McCarthy era
anti-communist Herbert A. Dean, are less nervous to highlight his anarchistic
sentiments and use Proudhon as a stick with which to beat him.41
Casper Sylvest also claimed that Laski ‘converted to Marxism’ in the 1920s,
but this is, I think, a slight exaggeration.42 Laski’s Fabian background, his defence
of the individual and of free speech and his anarchistic and socialist anti-
Communism,43 are anarchist in origin and as I will show the source here is
Proudhon. Moreover, Laski was publically chastised for the seeming paradox of
being a ‘libertarian Marxist’, while Alfred Zimmern saw his work as ‘insidious
syndicalism’ in the late thirties and the Times Literary Supplement believed his
work to be dangerous and worried about it anarchic implications. As Kramnick
and Sheehan note, these examples are all ‘consistent expressions of his overarching
anti-statism’, and anti-statism was not consistent with Marxism until after 1968.
38 For an example of how feminism was asked to fit neatly into pre-existing research programmes see,
Robert Keohane, ‘International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint’,
Millennium Journal of International Studies, 18 (1989), pp. 245–53; Cynthia Weber, ‘Good Girls,
Little Girls and Bad Girls: Male Paranoia in Robert Keohane’s Critique of Feminist International
Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 23 (1994), pp. 337–49.
39 That contemporary theorists of new medievalism, from Hedley Bull to Andrew Linklater and others
ignore this set of historical antecedents is typical of a broad rejection of inter-war thinkers in IR.
For a good survey of contemporary thinking on new medievalism, see Jörg Friedrichs, ‘The Meaning
of New Medievalism’, European Journal of International Relations, 7 (2001), pp. 475–502.
40 Peter Lamb, ‘Harold Laski: Political Theorist of a World in Crisis’, Review of International Studies,
25 (1999), pp. 329–42; Peter Lamb, Harold Laski: Problems of Democracy, the Sovereign State, and
International Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
41 Herbert A. Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski (New York: Columbia University Press,
1955), p. 55.
42 Sylvest, ‘Beyond the State?’.
43 Harold Laski, Communism (London: Butterworth, 1926).
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In short, there is more to Laski’s thought than meets the standard historical
eye.44
Laski left Oxford with a double first in 1914. From here he took a short tenure
at McGill University and then ended up at Harvard University. Within two years
of arriving Laski had become a close friend and confidante of the Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, considered both then and now to be a ‘liberal
constructionist’ and one of the fathers of the sociological tradition in jurispru-
dence.45 Laski left the US with his name on Hoover’s political subversives list
(though qualification for a place on this list was not particularly demanding). Over
the intervening years Holmes and Laski struck up a long and unusual friendship
and their letters are a wonderful source of historical illumination. For example, on
29 April 1917, Laski writes the following to Holmes:
My Dear Justice: A few words about a new enthusiasm. I have discovered Proudhon and I
want you to share the joy. Really he is immense and he has all the virtues. He is
clear-headed, far-sighted, anti-religious and his theory of the state satisfies all my anarchist
prejudices. I got on to him in the course of searching out the origins of the decentralising
ideas of today in France [. . .] He seems to me to have anticipated most of Karl Marx and
to have said it better. He realises the necessity of safeguarding the rights of personality, and
at the same time he is not afraid of collective action. He fits gloriously into the scheme of
my new book and I’ll make him a peg for a bundle of observations. But the main thing is
that he will give you some pleasant hours this summer if you can be so tempted.46
It is likely that the book to which Laski was referring was Authority in the Modern
State (1919). Interestingly, Justice Holmes does eventually read Proudhon and
comments that ‘Proudhon, who hates him [Marx] and who also seems to me not
above criticism, I think had more insight – though Marx had the force that any
man gets who rides even a limping theory of Evolution.’47 Later he added that it
was ‘my impression [. . .] that Proudhon had profounder insights than his rival.’48
This is striking not so much because it’s a conversation between one of the most
famous and established Supreme Court Judges and a junior lecturer in political
science at Harvard, but because of how Laski delivered on his promise to use
Proudhon’s ideas as a ‘peg’.
There are two main points to make about Proudhon’s ideas in this context: the
first analytical, the second sociological and historical.49 The first key aspect of
Proudhon’s thought for our purposes is his political theory as he developed it in
the Principle of Federation; the second is the way in which this theory informs his
analysis of the ontology, emergence and transformation of political order. Turning
to the first, Proudhon begins the work by developing an original theory of the
political antinomy. He argues that all of political life can be thought of as a
struggle between authority and liberty that has, over political time, evolved within
and alongside evolving political institutions. These institutions, the state included,
44 Isaak Kramnick and Barry Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life on the Left (London, Hamilton 1993),
p. 126.
45 Harold Laski, ‘The Political Philosophy of Mr Justice Holmes’, Yale Law Journal, 40 (1931),
pp. 689, 687.
46 Mark De Wolfe Howe (ed.), Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and
Harold J. Laski. 1916–1935 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 81–2.
47 Ibid., p. 161.
48 Ibid., p. 375.
49 I have discussed Proudhon’s international political theory in more detail elsewhere. See, for example,
Prichard, ‘Justice, Order and Anarchy’; Prichard, ‘Deepening Anarchism’.
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embody or attempt to resolve this antinomy in diﬀerent ways. ‘Regimes of
authority’, as Proudhon called them, include Monarchy and Patriarchy, while those
of liberty include democracy and anarchy. All are ideal types ‘fated to remain
perpetual desiderata’50 and yet attempts to realise pure form based on idealised
thinking is all-too frequent. For Proudhon paternalism is closest to an actually
existing ideal political order,51 and while Monarchy was the first attempt to make
it into a wider social and political order, all Monarchies must delegate authority.
This process of delegation is intrinsic to the corruption of political principles and
the encroachment of the real on the ideal – all political orders are therefore
entropic. Thus, ‘every real government is necessarily mixed’,52 and, contrary to
Kant’s ideas on the subject, there is no transcendental or ideal foundation to
politics. More salient in this regard is force and our idealisation/rationalisation of
it. As he stipulates quite clearly in La Guerre et la Paix, while the ideals of war
may drive it, the reality undermines these ideals and reveals that force and the
ideals we use to justify it, are the foundations of a stable society.53 Thus, the
question of the eﬃcacy of sovereignty, or of any other political order we build to
institutionalise force, is always an open one and the principles and structures of
political order are not only intellectually or conceptually entropic, but turning to
war and politics we can see that they are materially so also.
Like many before and since, Proudhon saw the global order as a system of
institutionalised anarchy, a political order without sovereign, tenuously formalised
in treaties. Here, states, characterised as ‘natural groups’ that are relatively
autonomous from all the other plural ‘natural groups’ of society, conduct their
inter-relations without a sovereign authority.54 But for Proudhon there was no
radical diﬀerence between the international and domestic when we consider states
to be a ‘natural group’ in the context of Empire and imperialism. Revolutions, civil
wars and the rise of new groups such as the industrial working class and
bourgeoisie, suggested to Proudhon that society was in constant flux with systems
of morality and wider intellectual frameworks such as religion or science, socialism
or nationalism, bringing intellectual coherence to this anarchic order. In short,
Proudhon suggests that anarchy is the ontological condition of all social life, of
politics as such. There is no actual sovereign.
Secondly, as I hope is becoming clear, Proudhon had a non-reductionist
sociological and historical method, one that united a pluralist and class-based view
of society with an historical view of politics. We see this most clearly in his
discussion of ‘natural groups’ and in Principle of Federation and in his extended
discussion of the political travesties facing the Polish and Slavic revolutionaries in
the nineteenth century. For Proudhon a two-class analysis was only appropriate for
primitive society. In modern society the antagonism between the working class and
50 P.-J. Proudhon, The Principle of Federation and the Need to Reconstitute the Party of the Revolution,
trans. and intro. Richard Vernon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p. 12.
51 Much can be said about this, but space does not allow me to do so here.
52 Proudhon, The Principle of Federation, p. 23.
53 Prichard, ‘Justice, Order and Anarchy’.
54 P.-J. Proudhon, La Guerre et la Paix, recherches sur la principe et la constitution du droit des gens
(Paris: E. Dentu, 1861); P.-J. Proudhon, La Fédération et l’Unité en Italie (Paris: E. Dentu, 1862);
P.-J. Proudhon, Nouvelles Observations sur l’Unité Italienne (Paris: E. Dentu, 1865); P.-J. Proudhon,
France et Rhin (Paris: A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven et Companie, 1868); Proudhon, Du Principe
Fédératif.
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the Imperial throne of Napoleon III was mediated by the bourgeoisie.55 Political
orders changed according to class alignments: royalty aligned with aristocracy
results in constitutional monarchy; where the people align with royalty or
aristocracy (and here Proudhon is imprecise in his terminology), ‘the government
will be an empire or autocratic democracy’.56 In the case of Poland, the situation
was relatively diﬀerent. Here, Proudhon argued that there were but two classes: the
nobility and the serfs.57 The argument he makes here is that until an intermediary
class appeared in Poland to act as a balancing force between the nobility and the
serf population, Poland would always be the plaything of great powers. This feudal
class structure in Poland was dire in its domestic and international consequences.
As Proudhon argued, ‘[s]’il est un coin sur le globe ou jamais il ait été vrai de dire
[. . .] que la propriété est le vol, c’est en Pologne.’58 Territory was annexed by
neighbouring Great Powers while the Polish nobility were simply parasitical upon
the serf population. While Proudhon recognised that this situation was extreme he
nevertheless argued that partition was in the Polish people’s best interests since
partition would at least dissuade outright control of the country by a single foreign
power and might encourage the emergence of a middle class to mediate between
nobility and serf and tie the upper classes to a conception of ‘Poland’ and, perhaps,
emancipate the serfs. For Proudhon then, the economic system is central to
understanding social conflict and social order.
Proudhon did not assume that society ought to have just two or three classes,
but that the progressive pluralisation of the class structure and the disaggregation,
rather than aggregation and centralisation, of political and economic power, would
be more conducive to achieving social order and justice, and make the prize of
total control by a domestic or foreign power so much harder to achieve.59 His
political ontology was such that the most obvious institutional form to bring unity
to this natural social diversity was a loose ‘principle of federation’. As with many
of his neo-Kantian contemporaries, Proudhon called for a united states of Europe,
but not states as they became within thirty years of his death, but states more like
the cantons Switzerland. Proudhon called for a form of political order in which all
the political and social cleavages of society, whether they are coterminous with
some formal border or not, ought to be federated and inter-related, thereby
bringing unity in diversity and ushering forth a quintessentially neo-medieval order.
The politics of Proudhon’s position ought to be quite clear. Since the state and
economy are manifestations of political power rather than natural right, they
deserve allegiance only insofar as they can be shown to achieve the ends they
profess to idealise. Should they fail to do so, and Proudhon argues that all
concentrations of power will inevitably fail to justify themselves absolutely, then
anarchy follows as both the ontological condition of all political community and
as the framework for the future. Statism, being entropic, is utopian, while
anarchism is a realistic political philosophy for a social order without sovereign
55 Proudhon, The Principle of Federation, p. 24.
56 Ibid., p. 24.
57 For a fuller discussion of this see Proudhon, ‘Si Les Traites de 1815 ont Cessé d’éxister’.
58 ‘[i]f ever there was a corner of the world in which it is possible to say [. . .] that property is theft,
it is in Poland.’ Proudhon, Du Principe Fédératif, p. 302.
59 For more on this see, for example, K. Steven Vincent, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French
Republican Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Prichard, ‘The Ethical Foundations
of Proudhon’s Republican Anarchism’.
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foundations. While the ideal of anarchy, or absolute ‘self-government’ as he calls
it, will remain ‘desiderata’, it has very real properties as an ideological framework
for conceptualising human liberty and this ought, he argues, to drive politics. It is
impossible to do justice to this fully here, but as I will show in the following
section, the statist alternative to his ideas became a very real nightmare. The aim
now is to show Laski’s debt to Proudhon and the responses it provoked.
Laski’s anti-capitalism has been well described by Lamb,60 I want to focus on
his politics and what we find is that it is Proudhon and not Marx which colours
his ideas. By way of context, as Schmidt has more than adequately shown, central
to Laski’s thought was his critique of the German idealist theory of the state. First
set out in ‘The Pluralistic State’ (1919), Laski attacks what he calls the ‘monistic’
and legalistic theory of the state. He argued that this theory substituted a short
hand theory of sovereignty for actual empirical analysis. As far as Laski was
concerned the state is only the expression of universal interest when it can be said
to be just such an expression – at all other times it is not and is usually the
expression of, as he put it, the interests of those who ‘wield economic power’.61
This argument only crudely reflects Proudhon’s position, but the article under
question also reflects more deeply on the lessons of federalism, particularly the US
model of federalism, for our conception of statehood and sovereignty and it is here
that Proudhon’s ideas emerge most clearly.
America, Laski argues, forces us to think of federalism not only ‘in the old
spatial terms’ but also in terms of ‘function’, of ‘the government of the cotton
industry’ and of ‘the civil service’.62 Natural political cleavages suggest a pluralist
theory of politics and society, which all ‘require a sovereignty of their own’.63 The
emergence of the working class suggested ‘a new movement for the conquest of
self-government’.64 He argued that ‘where administrative organisation is responsive
to the actual associations of men, there is greater chance not merely of eﬃciency
but of freedom also.’65 The political corollary of this theory is that states are thus
placed ‘on a moral parity with the acts of any other institution’ and must be judged
by the values they claim to uphold and by their actions, not a priori, and while
Laski claims this does not lead to anarchy, it is certainly not that far from
anarchism,66 for if it can be shown that the state possesses less moral authority
than any other institution, there lies an argument for its abandonment if it fails
(and it has done many times).67
The remainder of the article is a treasure trove for those with post-statist
inclinations, but to flesh out this anarchistic temperament in more detail it is worth
turning to Authority in the Modern State and Liberty in the Modern State, the titles
of which perhaps coincidently correspond to the central political antinomy of
60 Lamb, Harold Laski.
61 Harold Laski, ‘The Pluralistic State’, The Philosophical Review, 28, (1919), p. 566.
62 Ibid., p. 570.
63 Ibid., p. 569. This problematic use of sovereignty in this context was also typical of Proudhon’s
Principle of Federation.
64 Ibid., p. 571.
65 Ibid.
66 It is interesting that while Proudhon is often referenced by Laski, he refuses to classify anarchism
in anything more than crudely syndicalist or anti-authoritarian terms. Laski’s faith in the modern
state meant he was not an anarchist in any truly meaningful sense of the word, despite being deeply
indebted to Proudhonist ideas. See Laski, Authority in the Modern State, pp. 88, 114.
67 Laski, ‘The Pluralist State’, p. 572.
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Proudhon’s classic text in federalist theory. In the former work, Laski turns to the
question of anarchy early on. He argues that the state is not a priori an actor, nor
can its actions be deemed morally good without the express (rather than the
assumed) support of all people it is designed to represent. Since this is impossible
in reality, and since all people at all times can, at least in principle, deny the moral
authority of the state and act in any which way they like, the question of political
order and authority is a sociological and historical, rather than a philosophical,
one. But of course, what this also presupposes is that ‘[t]he possibility of anarchy
is theoretically at every moment present’.68 ‘Every government is a de facto
government except insofar as the rightness of its eﬀorts makes it de jure’.69 The
principle of sovereignty might be a useful legal shorthand in some contexts, but it
reflects the ambitions of states rather than the reality, since nothing is actually ever
sovereign in the Bodinian or Hobbesian sense. We might therefore legitimately
wonder whether it is sensible to structure the formal architecture of world politics
around a useful short-hand.
This conception clearly radically alters the way in which we conceptualise
political power. Moreover, it changes what a state must be. For Laski, as for
Proudhon, the emergence of the working class and of other functional units, as well
as the rejection of state sovereignty, meant the German idealist theory of the state
was a fantasy. Pluralist state theory on the other hand
[i]mplies a conception of society as basically federal in nature [. . .] the paramount nature of
the state is ipso facto denied [. . . This] is to foreshadow a division, not of powers, but of
power on the basis of functions. It is to picture a society in which authority is not
hierarchical but coordinate. Nor is the basis of its definition in any sense a matter of a
priori definition. It must change as social necessity may demand.70
Contrary to Lamb’s assertion that ‘Laski was not attracted to federal solutions’,71
what we find is that Laski’s works are littered with federalist lines of argument and
advocacy. Indeed, one might go further to argue that functional and administrative
federalism is at the heart of Laksi’s politics.72 Whereas Proudhon had argued ‘The
twentieth century will open the age of federations, or else humanity will undergo
another purgatory of a thousand years’,73 Laski believed that ‘the federalist society
towards which we are moving’ was inevitable.74 Moreover, Laski argued that the
‘democratic society must reject the sovereign state as by definition inconsistent with
democracy’75 and ‘that private ownership of the means of production are no longer
compatible with democratic institutions.’76 The federalist alternative was all he
could see to the aggrandising state across Europe. In The State in Theory and
Practice (1935) Laski goes so far as to argue that ‘the sovereign state is
incompatible with the establishment of an eﬀective world order; yet every serious
move which looks to the erosion of its sovereignty is checkmated at some pivotal
68 Laski, Authority in the Modern State, p. 30.
69 Ibid., p. 58.
70 Ibid., p. 74.
71 Lamb, Harold Laski, p. 333.
72 Laski, Authority in the Modern State, p. 89.
73 Richard Vernon, ‘Introduction’, in Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, The Principle of Federation, p. xiii.
74 Laski, Authority in the Modern State, p. 89.
75 Ibid., p. 109.
76 Laski, Liberty in the Modern State, p. 30.
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point’.77 Given the pressing problems of his time, which cannot have been any
greater than our own impending ecological collapse, Laski was moved to argue
that ‘the sovereign state and civilisation have irreconcilable interests’.78
Moreover, not only the state, but the international system itself was also the
expression of minority interests. Continuing a standard theme by now, Laski
argued in his Introduction to Politics that states are not in any real sense sovereign,
least of all new states emerging on to the international scene and finding their
actions curtailed by a pre-existing body of international law,79 but that also,
because societies and states interact and cooperate, ‘there is not, in the historic and
technical sense, the possibility of a sovereign state.’80 Laski also cautiously
observed that ‘we are at the beginning of a new epoch’ where citizens can appeal
to courts beyond their state, where international criminal courts could become
common and despite the fact that progress in this regard is not inevitable, the
progressive decentring of the state is an historical fact and one that ought, he
thought, to be pushed forward.81 Alongside this, Laski’s uncompromising anti-
capitalism illustrated clearly to his authors which direction he would like this
anti-statism to have been pushed.
Schmitt: the fascist anti-pluralist
What I will show now is how Schmitt and Morgenthau twist and distort Laski and
Proudhon’s thought for their own political purposes and the consequences of these
moves. In his essay ‘Ethic of State and Pluralistic State’, Carl Schmitt’s aim was
to defend the ‘ethic of state’ from the pluralists who would undermine its unity –
most notably Harold Laski and G. D. H. Cole. While what is clear about their
work is their socialism, Schmitt chooses to ignore it completely. Instead Schmitt
argued that the pluralist critique amounted to a new political theology and political
muddle. The new theology comes from what Schmitt saw as the pluralist’s need to
appeal for a transcendent ‘humanity’ to justify their claims to override the state.
He also observes, however, that any pluralist ethic must result in the liberal
‘“agnostic”state, the stato agnostico which fascist criticism disparages’.82 Taking on
Laski here, Schmitt claims that not only is this ‘agnostic state’ both impossible and
undesirable. It is also philosophically and historically muddled. States cannot be
the impartial arbiter of plural claims, nor was it ever such. Schmidt also argued
that the pluralism Laski advances as a critique of the idealist theory of the state
had to be based on medieval conceptions of political order, but here the
transcendent and universalist order was religious and quite illiberal. Quite why this
is significant is made clear when we understand Schmitt’s position, not Laski’s.83
77 Laski, The State in Theory and Practice, p. 227.
78 Ibid., p. 224.
79 H. J. Laski, An Introduction to Politics, new edition prepared by Martin Wight (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1951), pp. 88–90.
80 Ibid., p. 91.
81 Ibid., p. 99.
82 Schmitt, ‘Ethic of State’, p. 198. The return to Schmitt by the left is lamentable.
83 For a similar critique of Laski, see Sylvest, ‘Beyond the State?’.
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Schmitt claims that Laski is highly individualist in his civic ethic, relying on
individual judgement too heavily, and that this too clashes with the notion of a
transcendent or unified humanity that must, he claims (without much in the way
of analysis), underpin his pluralist ethic.84 Schmitt continues that the defence of
humanity is simply theological: ‘the name of humanity is no less absurd than the
name of God’, he argues, and then cites Proudhon in his criticism of Laski’s
cosmopolitan ethic: ‘he who speaks of humanity seeks to deceive’.85 Because of
Laski’s clear debt to Proudhon, this criticism is illustrative of the wilful misreadings
Schmitt was willing to employ in support of his arguments. Furthermore, Schmitt’s
critique of the notion of humanity that he claims underlies Laski’s work is an echo
of his critique of Proudhon in Political Theology. Here Schmitt argues that,
Every political idea in one way or another takes a position on the ‘nature’ of man and
presupposes that he is either ‘by nature good’ or ‘by nature evil’. This issue can only be
clouded [. . .] but it cannot be evaded [. . .]. To the committed theistic anarchists, man is
decisively good, and all evil is the result of theological thought and its derivatives, including
all ideas concerning authority, state and government [. . .Proudhon’s] antitheological
anarchism would have to be derived consistently from the axiom of the good man.86
One might agree with the argument, but it is not based in fact. Indeed, Schmitt
recognises as much with the qualifier ‘would have to be’, since no anarchist that
lived through the nineteenth century believed that man was essentially good, and
no one who had read Laski would believe this about his position either.87 But
Schmitt ties this critique of anarchism to his critique of liberalism and then both
to Laski once more. Because, Schmitt argues, anarchists ‘would have to’ believe
man to be good, their liberalism is characterised by their inability to take decisive
political decisions that might undermine the presumed liberty of the other. Schmitt
psychologises that this creates an existential anguish within the anarchist which
ultimately and inevitably leads those like Bakunin who established secret revolu-
tionary societies, he argues here, to the role of ‘the dictator of the antidictator-
ship’.88 This fear of the decision is mirrored in liberalism which, on the basis of
reason and a faith in humanity, seeks the division of powers in order to undermine
absolutism, and makes the ‘king, a mere executive organ with his every act
dependent on the consent of cabinet, thus removing once again that personal
element’.89 Schmitt argues that the liberal’s faith in the division of powers, or the
pluralists claim that there is no sovereignty, constitutes an overly optimistic faith
in humanity rather than deep suspicion of the centralisation of power which would
be a more accurate description. But for Schmitt this pluralisation would be
unacceptable. Turning to de Maistre for guidance (as does Martin Wight at the
84 Schmitt, ‘Ethic of State’, pp. 200–1.
85 Ibid., p. 205. For another example of the muddle Schmitt’s misleading use of Proudhon’s critique of
universalism has caused for IR theorists, see Richard Devetak, ‘Between Kant and Pufendorf:
Humanitarian Intervention, Statist Anti-Cosmopolitanism and Critical International Theory’, Review
of International Studies, 33 (2007), p. 157; David Chandler, ‘The Revival of Carl Schmitt in
International Relations: The Last Refuge of Critical Theorists?’, Millennium: Journal of International
Studies, 37 (2008), p. 33.
86 Schmitt, Political Theology, pp. 56–7.
87 For more myth-busting, see, for example, David Hartley, ‘Communitarian Anarchism and Human
Nature’, Anarchist Studies, 3 (1995), pp. 145–64; David Morland, Demanding the Impossible? Human
Nature and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Social Anarchism (London: Cassell, 1997).
88 Ibid., p. 66.
89 Ibid., p. 60.
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close of his essay above), he argues that all men are in fact evil. From this a priori
presupposition, which by definition does not need to be supported by the judicious
evaluation of available empirical evidence,90 it was possible for Schmitt to defend
the sovereign act ‘as if it were infallible’, and he then insisted that we accept that
‘authority is good once it exists:“Any government is good once it is established [. . .]
making a decision is more important than how a decision is made.”’91 Clearly we
are some way from Laski’s pluralism here.
Schmitt then accuses Laski of another classical liberal vice: a faith that reason
can move us from the irrationality of statist politics to the rationality of a more
liberal version. Given that no such universal rationality can be said to exist, a
position Laski would probably agree with, Schmitt is led to defend a very specific
form of unity. Schmitt defends an undiﬀerentiated political unity so as to avoid the
‘civil war’ that would emerge should groups be able to decide amongst themselves
how to order their aﬀairs. This Hobbesian myth-building serves what Wolin has
called the ethic of ‘horror’ that surfaces in all Schmitt’s writings.92 By pointing to
man’s malign nature and by denying the possibility of the pastiche of a liberal
utopia, Schmitt buttressed his Manichean world view – one which must be resolved
by power and authority. This ethic of state is developed through an existential fear
of conflict, the protean need for stability and the ensuing vision, developed by
Schmitt, that pluralism or the erosion of sovereignty and state power, in the
context of the failure of the Weimar Republic, is the source of this chaos. This is
the philosophic roots of fascism made stark. Schmitt argues that, ‘[o]nce the reality
of social life renders the unity of the state problematic’,
an unbearable situation is created for each citizen of the state, for at the same time the
normal situation falls away, together with the presupposition of every ethical and every
legal norm [. . .] Then there comes into being, alongside the duty of state which resides in its
subjection of ethical norms, and alongside the duties against the state, a duty of ethic of
state of a completely diﬀerent kind – the duty towards statehood.93
The duty towards continually building the state is the final solution of the problem
of plurality. These are the roots of fascism set out in more or less plain English. It
was surely lost on none of Schmitt’s readers that Laski was also Jewish. It mattered
not, it seems, that Schmitt refused to engage with Laski’s arguments, and yet the
state survived, and so it seems did Schmitt’s work – both worrying facts in their own
right.
Morgenthau’s critique of Laski
Morgenthau was, of course, neither anti-Semitic nor a fascist. However, ironically
perhaps, Morgenthau had conventionally liberal ideas about the power of law and
90 Future work relating human nature to world politics might consider Marc Hauser’s Moral Minds:
How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong (New York: Ecco, 2006).
91 Ibid., pp. 55–6.
92 Richard Wolin, ‘Carl Schmitt, Political Existentialism and the Total State’, Theory and Society, 19
(1990), pp. 389–416; Richard Wolin, ‘Carl Schmitt: The Conservative Revolutionary and the
Aesthetics of Horror’, Political Theory, 20 (1992), pp. 424–47.
93 Schmitt, ‘Ethic of State’, pp. 207–8.
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the possibility of progress during the Weimar republic, but veered towards a
not-unique brand of liberal totalitarianism after the demise of fascism.94 While
Morgenthau was forced to flee the Nazis after his ideas had influenced Schmitt’s,
it was not until he arrived in America that the influence worked the other way.95
As many have argued, this influence was also central to his theory of international
politics. What I will now show is how Schmitt and Morgenthau developed a
parallel critique of (a mythological) anarchism, and what this implies for our
common sense understanding of who and what IR is for.
Hans Morgenthau’s article on Harold Laski, ‘The Corruption of Liberal
Thought: Harold Laski’ was first published in March 1950 – unfortunately the
month Laski passed away. While references to Laski in the article suggest he was
not aware of his recent death, the paper nevertheless reads as something of a grim
obituary to a brand of inter-war socialist liberalism, in the context of the rise of
‘realism’ and a widespread fear of the ‘un-American’ red-menace. Of central
concern to scholars of IR is that Morgenthau’s conception of the national interest,
a concept so central to his Politics Among Nations, was predicated on a Schmittian
conception of the state. A pluralist state, pulling in de-centralised directions with
no sovereign point of authority, would be far harder to represent internationally
than one in which we all marched to the same drum beat. In this sense, this debate
is epochal in a number of significant ways for IR theory. That ‘realism’ should take
this particularly statist direction was due in no small part to the social and
intellectual context in which it developed and to the critique of an anarchistic
political theory.
Morgenthau states his view of Laski quite bluntly. In the opening paragraph he
argues: ‘Professor Laski, the most brilliant, erudite, and prolific exponent of the
last stage of liberalism, exemplifies the philosophic insuﬃciency and political
confusion of liberal thought.’96 The question is, how does Morgenthau understand
liberalism and how does he think Laski fails as a liberal? Despite recognising that
Laski’s work contains persuasive criticisms of both sovereignty and private
property, Morgenthau claims that ‘the philosophic position of Laski is that of
classic liberalism. Professors Hayek and Mises can hardly have found fault with
it.’97 This is not only confusing but categorically incorrect. Interestingly, Morgen-
thau makes exactly the same argument against Proudhon’s thought in the few lines
of engagement with it in Politics Among Nations. Here Morgenthau argues that
Proudhon, like his contemporaries Cobden and Bright, was ‘convinced that the
removal of trade barriers was the only condition for the establishment of
permanent harmony among nations, and might even lead to the disappearance of
94 See, Jan Willem Honig, ‘Totalitarianism and Realism: Hans Morgenthau’s German Years’, in
Benjamin Frankel (ed.), Roots of Realism (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 283–313. First published
in Security Studies, 5 (1995), pp. 283–313.
95 William Scheuerman has shown that Schmitt took Morgenthau’s main critique of The Concept of the
Political and revised subsequent editions accordingly, without referencing the source of his revised
ideas. This is a strange intellectual relationship indeed, and one that has been widely written on.
See Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt, chap. 9. See also, William E. Scheuerman, ‘Carl Schmitt and
Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond’, in Michael C. Williams (ed.), Realism Reconsidered: The
Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007),
pp. 62–92.
96 Morgenthau, ‘The Corruption of Liberal Thought’, p. 29.
97 Ibid.
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international politics altogether.’98 As such, Proudhon becomes a classic liberal at
heart and thus brings upon himself all the opprobrium heaped upon them by the
so-called realists. Laski and Proudhon’s comparable socialist anti-statism simply
does not figure in his analysis, despite this being the undisputable core of their
arguments.
Perhaps then more confusingly still, Morgenthau then immediately goes on to
link classical liberalism and Laski explicitly to anarchism. Beginning by making
reference to the perpetual antinomy at the heart of politics, ‘the struggle between
Liberty and Authority’, Morgenthau then reiterates a position made famous since
by Robert Paul Wolﬀ99 that ‘a consistent liberalism leads to anarchism. Laski
recognises that connection, too, and approves of it’. Morgenthau, however, is
diametrically opposed to this, arguing that this rational political personality,
through which liberty would have to be realised, is ‘impossible’ in the empirical
sense, and undesirable in the philosophical sense since it would undermine that
‘political authority [. . .] founded upon a consensus of all or at least of the majority,
that is upon shared moral and political convictions’. Morgenthau continues in truly
Rousseauean, if not Schmittian vein, arguing:
Such consensus may be the product of a common religion, a secular tradition, the national
mores or it may be instilled in the reluctant citizens with fire and sword. Without it there
can be no state and no government; for without it there can be no political authority
accepted at least by the majority as legitimate, nor that voluntary obedience which the
author so rightly stresses. Here again, the conclusion from the premise is anarchy.100
Laski was quite clear and stated repeatedly that anarchy was not his objective, and
so why Morgenthau chose to ignore this can only be inferred from his wider
argument. Political happiness, for it to be political at all, cannot be open to debate,
but must be decided by the state. The alternative is ‘the accident of implicit
valuations’101 and, as far as Morgenthau and Schmitt would see it, anarchy again.
Morgenthau then repeats Schmitt’s argument that one of the defining features
of Laski’s thought is his faith in reason and its ability to adequately mediate
between competing claims to power. Morgenthau claimed that Laski was naive to
think that ‘reason in the abstract’ can solve actually existing social conflicts without
recourse to some un-rational, that is, protean political philosophy. This position is
also reminiscent of Morgenthau’s criticism of what he saw to be Proudhon’s
misguided attempt to become the first scientist of the international,102 but he seems
to ignore the centrality of history of sociology, of class analysis and of a pluralist
social ontology to Proudhon and Laski’s thought, choosing instead to presume
both to be quintessentially liberal rationalists.
Things become less clear when Morgenthau takes on Laski’s analysis of the
emergence of fascism. Laski’s analysis, Morgenthau contends, is ‘cliché Marxism’,
in that it puts capitalism at the heart of the emergence of fascism rather than the
‘pseudo-religious fanaticism with the worship of violence for its own sake’, which
Morgenthau isolates in classically (if not clichéd) Weberian fashion.103 Morgenthau
98 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 35.
99 Robert Paul Wolﬀ, In Defence of Anarchism (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1998).
100 Morgenthau, ‘The Corruption of Liberal Thought’, p. 31.
101 Ibid., p. 32.
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argues that what the rise of fascism shows us is the bankruptcy of liberal thought
– not that fascism has triumphed, but that the principles and postulates of
liberalism simply cannot counter it. By way of comparison, Morgenthau takes
Laski’s post-war ambivalence regarding Stalin’s Soviet experiment as further
evidence of the folly of liberalism, rather than of Marxism, and here the tenor of
the article verges on the hysterical. As the title of the collection of the essays from
which this critique of Laski is drawn suggests, The Restoration of American Politics
is precisely what Morgenthau was endeavouring to achieve and Politics Among
Nations and his critique of Laski as part of a wider intellectual and political project
to buttress US power. Anarchism can have no place here. But surely, if anarchism
and pluralism can teach us anything at all, and here Morgenthau’s analysis does
a huge disservice to Laski’s thought, it is that the homogenisation of political
community and centralisation of political power are precisely the problem rather
than the solution.104
Finally, Morgenthau then makes the interesting and typically realist argument
against Laski’s anarchistic leanings by pointing out that his ideal-typical pluralist
society operates in two fundamentally utopian ways. Anarchism, he argues, cannot
be both an ideal solution to the problem of liberty and authority and a yardstick
by which to measure actually existing political communities: ‘If the author is
inconsistent but is quite naturally moved by strong personal preferences, as Laski
is, he will measure some political systems by the ideal, others by the attainable, and
thus obtain the political conclusions that he prefers to obtain.’105 This is a good
point, however, on inspection, Morgenthau’s objection equally to his own so-called
‘realism’. Realism was both a conservative vision and an ethical yardstick.106
Morgenthau’s debt to Schmitt and his critique of Laski performed a central
heuristic role in his political and ontological construction of the world into
competing and more or less homogenous nations. Consider the place of the
national interest in Morgenthau’s thought and at once we understand that for such
an interest to exist, let alone be actualised, a more or less homogenous state, all
pulling in the same direction is the minimum pre-requisite; ‘[a]ny segment of the
population which feels itself permanently deprived of its rights and of full
participation in the life of the nation will tend to have a lower national morale and
be less“patriotic”’. The challenge must be to integrate all divergent segments of the
population. But ought this to be done by homogenising their interests or by
disaggregating the state? While Morgenthau recognises that national power is
correspondingly reduced and ‘foreign policy will always be precarious’ to the
degree that a population is fragmented, national unity must be the goal.107 It is in
this context that we must read his defence of totalitarianism, since as Morgenthau
recognised, the totalitarian state was able to bridge the gap in ‘identification’
between people and government. But Morgenthau argues that ‘[w]hat totalitari-
anism can achieve only by force, fraud, and deification of the state, democracy
104 Indeed, recent critical scholarship is taking up where Proudhon and Laski left oﬀ by showing what
the centralisation of power has meant for the possibility of human freedom in the twentieth century.
The central text in this regard is Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community.
105 Ibid., p. 32.
106 Piki Ish-Shalom, ‘The Triptych of Realism, Elitism and Conservatism’, International Studies Review,
8 (2006), pp. 441–68.
107 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 152.
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must try to accomplish through the free interplay of popular forces, guided by a
wise and responsible government.’108 Religion, sport and cultural activities are the
principal means to realise this duty towards statehood, much as was the
development of a sense of a shared fate through economic integration. This
common identification is central to the personification of the nation and the ability
to endow it with moral agency and to be able to speak of the national interest
convincingly. In the absence of this common identification, indeed, if we were to
adopt a pluralist state theory, what would the implications be for international
politics and IR? It is Proudhon and Laski’s answers to this question that
Morgenthau and Schmitt so radically distorted.
Conclusion
Over the course of this article I have given an account of some of the core reasons
for the absence of anarchism in contemporary IR and have done so by giving
contextualised re-readings of some key texts from the formative years of the
discipline. The account I have given illustrates that IR was founded as a discourse
for states. In the main, the largely realist-dominated discipline was conservative in
what it envisaged for the future, the way it narrated its past and the options
so-called realists saw in the present. At each turn statism was at the core of the
collective reason of the discipline. It is inconsequential that contemporary IR
displays more pluralism and diversity than it did during the 1950s and 1960s and
that since this time anti-statism has become standard fare in IR. This fact still begs
the question this article has sought to answer. Why is there no anarchism in a
discipline Brian Schmidt dubbed ‘the political discourse of anarchy’, and what can
answering this question tell us about the history and purpose of IR? The answers
are no doubt more complex than the account I have given here, but I hope this
article contributes to the growing body of literature that continues to uncover the
hidden history of the discipline and shows how absence, disciplining and politics
shape what it is to know what IR is about, who it is for and what it is for. My
answers in this context have revolved around the totalitarian roots of realism – and
thus by extension post-war IR – and the incompatibility of anarchism to the
project of rebuilding states and fighting the Cold War during that period. Because
this critique of anarchistic elements within early IR was flawed, there is an urgent
need to recover what was lost and consider the implications of marginalising
anarchist thought. To turn to anarchism would raise questions regarding what and
who IR is for once again. While this is not the place to explore these questions in
detail, it is clear that the analysis I have given would suggest some avenues for
further research.
First of all, it seems quite clear that anarchism has contributions to make at the
level of state theory in IR. This would reconnect IR with its origins. During the
formative years of the discipline, ‘issues associated with international relations were
addressed within the framework provided by the theory of the state. Rather than
a sharp divergence between the domestic and the international realms, there was a
108 Ibid., p. 154.
1668 Alex Prichard
fundamental convergence’.109 Indeed, seeing states as groups of people (not to be
confused with society) interrelated with other groups in complex social matrices
would suggest, as Colin Wight has done at length, a sociological framework for
IR,110 one that embeds the inter-state within the inter-national and both within
wider and more complex social relations. Secondly, anarchist thought might also
be a source of political insight and a spur for political imagination. This will likely
revolve around critiques of and assistance to those who can only see social or
political change and innovation through state-like lenses.111 Third, anarchist
thought might also equip political and social theorists with a vocabulary for
speaking truth to power. This would be to speak from a uniquely left-libertarian
perspective, one largely forgotten but always necessary, unencumbered with the
statist concerns of the traditional left, but intellectually equipped to provide a
robust critique of neo-liberalism nonetheless. Fourth, in an age where statism is on
the wane, anarchism can provide both a critique of the processes that bought it
about and provide a set of conceptual and political tools to help us think through
institutional responses to the coming changes. Finally, basic historical research is
warranted, work that recovers the long-lost anarchist approach to world politics.
It is clear that anarchism (and IR) was born in a quite diﬀerent time and with quite
diﬀerent priorities to those of our own, but recovering the context and intentions
of nineteenth century anarchists will help us reinvestigate and question the
accepted meanings of such contemporary concepts as anarchy, anarchism and
anarchist.
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